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Abstract. Many users store their data in a cloud, which might not be
fully trusted, for the purpose of convenient data access and sharing. For
efficiently accessing the stored data, keyword search can be performed
by the cloud server remotely with a single query from the user. How-
ever, the cloud server cannot directly search the data if it is encrypted.
One of solutions could be to allow the user to download the encrypted
data, in order to carry out a search; however, it might consume huge
network bandwidth. To solve this problem, the notion of keyword search
on encrypted data (searchable encryption) has been proposed. In this
paper, a special variant of searchable encryption with threshold access
is studied. Unlike some previous proposals which have fixed group and
fixed threshold value, we define a new notion named Threshold Broad-
cast Encryption with Keyword Search (TBEKS) for dynamic groups and
flexible threshold values. We formalize the security of a TBEKS scheme
via a new security model named IND-T-CKA which captures indistin-
guishability against chosen keyword attacks in the threshold setting. We
also propose the first practical TBEKS scheme with provable security in
our IND-T-CKA security model, assuming the hardness of the Decisional
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem.
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1 Introduction
Cloud computing [8] provides flexible computing resources, including data stor-
age, to end users. Users are able to upload their data to the cloud for later
access by themselves or by other users (i.e., data sharing) via the Internet. In
other words, on-demand data access is available via the Internet where users
can search and then download what they need. To prevent a huge amount of
network bandwidth consumption, the search operations are usually done by the
cloud instead of letting users download all the data and search locally.
Meanwhile, to ensure the privacy of the users, some sensitive data should
be protected against the cloud server while the keyword search functionality is
maintained. Specifically, the data to be searched and the keyword used in the
search operation should be inaccessible by any non-authorised parties, including
the cloud. With such a demand, various searchable encryption schemes [1, 3, 4,
7, 11] have been proposed to enable secure searching over encrypted data. In a
public key searchable encryption scheme, Bob encrypts both the data and the
keywords under Alice’s public key and uploads the ciphertexts to the cloud. As
both the data and the keywords are protected, it is hard for the cloud server to
gain any information about the data. To perform search operations, Alice gener-
ates a trapdoor for a keyword [1, 3, 4] or multiple keywords [7] and transfers it to
the cloud via a secure communication channel. Upon receiving Alice’s trapdoor
of the keyword, the cloud server searches the whole database and returns the
search results back to Alice. Finally, Alice downloads the ciphertexts from the
cloud based on the search results, and decrypts them to get the original data.
In the normal searchable encryption schemes, the accessibility to the data
and its search operation is authorised to a user [1, 4] or a set of users [12, 15]
where any single user in the authorised user set can perform the search and
the decryption operations. However, a single identity may not be trustful in
some scenarios. For instance, a research team of a company is developing a new
product and needs to access the company database. The head of the research
department does not trust any single member of the research team to access
the database, since an individual member may leak the secrets of the company
for monetary purposes. To reduce the risk of a single point failure, a threshold
searchable encryption scheme is more suitable where the accessibility to the data
is decentralised from a single member to n members of the team where searching
the database and decrypting a ciphertext both require at least t members to work
together. To be more precise, in order to perform a search operation successfully,
the cloud needs to obtain for a keyword at least t trapdoors from the n authorised
users. If such a threshold searchable encryption also supports dynamic groups
and flexible threshold values, the company can specify different classifications
for different data by changing the authorised user set and the threshold value t.
This paper aims to provide a practical solution for this problem.
1.1 Related Work
Boneh et al. [4] introduced the searchable encryption, namely public encryption
with keyword search (PEKS), and defined the security model that the adversary
cannot identify the keyword from the ciphertext without a trapdoor. Xu et al.
[14] argued that PEKS is insecure under key guessing attack (KGA) since the
remote server can always create a ciphertext of a keyword and test it with the
target trapdoor. If the keyword space is in polynomial size, the adversary can
get the keyword from the target trapdoor in polynomial time. Xu et al. [14]
also proposed a method to enhance the security under KGA by encrypting and
searching for the fuzzy keyword instead of the exact keyword.
Boneh et al. [4] showed that PEKS implies identity-based encryption (IBE)
but not vice versa. Nevertheless, Abdalla et al. [1] proposed a PEKS scheme
generically constructed using anonymous identity-based encryption (AnonIBE).
They also proposed identity-based searchable encryption (IBKS) from a 2-leveled
anonymous hierarchical identity-based encryption (AnonHIBE). Similarly, search-
able broadcasting encryption, namely broadcast encryption with keyword search
(BEKS), can be constructed using 2-leveled anonymous hierarchical identity-
coupling broadcast encryption (AnonHICBE) [2].
Searchable encryption can be divided into the single user setting (e.g. PEKS)
and the multi-user setting. Broadcast encryption with keyword search [2] and
attribute-based encryption with keyword search (ABKS) [12, 15] are in the multi-
user setting. In BEKS, the keyword is encrypted for a set of users. If a user is
in the target set, the user can generate the trapdoor for testing the ciphertext.
In ABKS, the keyword is encrypted under a policy or with attributes. Only the
user who has a match of the policy and the attributes can generate the trapdoor
for testing the ciphertext.
However, in both BEKS and ABKS, the individual target user has the full
ability to generate the trapdoor. Wang et al. [13] decentralised the ability of
trapdoor generation to multi-user in a threshold manner, which requires at least
k of n users to generate the trapdoor. Siad [10] gave a formal definition of
threshold public key encryption with keyword search (TPEKS), and generically
constructed a TPEKS scheme with threshold (n, t)-IBE but no concrete scheme
is provided. In Wang et al.’s scheme [13], a trusted centralised manager is re-
quired to generate the private keys for all users. To enhance the security, Siad’s
scheme [10] leverages a distributed protocol in private keys generation instead
of a trusted third party.
We find that both schemes [10, 13] are limited to a fixed number of users and
fixed threshold value at the key generation stage. It makes adding or removing
a user impossible, and changing the threshold value for individual ciphertext
impossible. To encrypt a keyword for different set of users or with different
threshold value, we have to generate the private keys for all the users in the
target set. If it is an (n, t)-TPEKS scheme where t is the threshold value such
that 0 < t ≤ n and n is the maximum number of users, the users have to store
O(n ·2n) private-public key pairs for the possible ciphertexts, although they may
share the same global public parameters.
1.2 Our Contribution
In this paper, we introduce a new notion named Threshold Broadcast Encryp-
tion with Keyword Search (TBEKS). We provide a formal definition of TBEKS
and a formal security model, named indistinguishability in the threshold setting
against chosen keyword attack (IND-T-CKA), to capture its security. Moreover,
we construct a practical TBEKS scheme and prove that it is IND-T-CKA secure
under the Decisional Bilinear Diffle-Hellman (DBDH) assumption in random
oracle model.
In our TBEKS definition and scheme, users are ad hoc, i.e., they can generate
their own private-public key pair individually. The data owner selects a target
set of users and threshold value t to encrypt a keyword, and then uploads the full
ciphertext to the remote server. To search the files containing a certain keyword,
at least t users of the target user set need to generate their trapdoor shares for
that keyword, and transfer those trapdoor shares to the remote server, in order
to enable the remote server to perform the search operation. Our scheme does
not fix the user group and the threshold value at the system setup, and only
one private-public key pair is required for each user. Thus we solve Wang et al.’s
open problem for dynamic group [13].
1.3 Paper Organisation
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we review some
essential tools and assumptions, including threshold secret sharing schemes and
bilinear maps. We define TBEKS and its security model in section 3. Then we
propose our TBEKS scheme in section 4 and prove that it is secure under the
security model defined in section 3.2. Finally, conclusion is addressed in section 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [9] divides a secret s into n pieces s1, . . . , sn using
a k − 1 degree polynomial and distributes to n users. If and only if k users or
more come together, they can recover s by polynomial interpolation. Knowing
k − 1 pieces of s does not reveal any information about s. This scheme is also
called (k, n) Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme. Details are shown as follows.
Let GF (q) be a finite field with order q where q > n. Each user Ui is asso-
ciated with a public unique number ui ∈ GF (q). We also represent randomly
choosing r from a space S by r ∈R S. To share a secret s ∈ GF (q) among
a user set S = {U1, . . . , Un}, a random k − 1 degree polynomial is picked as
p(x) = s +
∑k−1
j=1 ajx
j where aj ∈R GF (q). Each user in the user set S gets a
share si = p(ui). When k users come together and form a user set A ⊂ S, we










ui−u` . Then we can
recover s = p(0). Obviously, we can recover any point by

















A bilinear map is a function that maps two group spaces to a third space. For
simplicity, we exploit the same bilinear map used in [5] where the first two group
spaces are the same. Let G1 be a additive group, G2 be a multiplicative group,
and both are cyclic groups of prime order q. Let P be a generator of G1. A
bilinear map e : G1 ×G1 → G2 has the following properties:
– Bilinearity: ∀a, b ∈ Zq, e(aP, bP ) = e(P, P )ab.
– Non-Degeneracy: e(P, P ) 6= 1.
– Efficiency: It can be computed for any possible input efficiently.
There is a computational hard problem named Decisional Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman problem (DBDH) coming with the bilinear map that we can rely on to
construct our cryptographic scheme. The definition of DBDH problem is shown
as follows.
Definition 1 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem). Let a, b, c be
uniformly and independently chosen from Zq, and T be uniformly and indepen-
dently chosen from G2. Giving two probability distributions DBDH = (P, aP, bP,
cP, e(P, P )abc) and Drand = (P, aP, bP, cP, T ), there is an algorithm A can dis-




∣∣∣Pr[1← A(D U←− DBDH)]− Pr[1← A(D U←− Drand)]∣∣∣
where D
U←− DBDH means that D is uniformly and independently chosen from
DBDH . The advantage can be represented alternatively as
D0




∣∣∣∣Pr[b = b′ ← A(Db)]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
The DBDH problem is computational hard if and only if the advantageAdvDBDHA
is negligible. In other words, it is hard to distinguish whether a vector is chosen
from DBDH or Drand other than a random guess. Our scheme is secure based
on the assumption of the hardness of the DBDH problem.
3 Threshold Broadcast Encryption with Keyword Search
3.1 Definition
Generally speaking, a Threshold Broadcast Encryption with Keyword Search
(TBEKS)1 scheme is used along with a Threshold Broadcast Encryption (TBE)
scheme [6], where the former encrypts the keywords and the latter encrypts the
message2 . Independent private-public key pairs are suggested for the combina-
tion of the above mentioned system. In TBKES, there are three roles involved,
including the data owner who encrypts the message and the keywords, the
server who stores the ciphertexts and performs the requested search, and the
user who has the access to the decryption of the message and generates search
queries. TBEKS works as follows. The data owner chooses a set of users and a
threshold value t, and encrypts the message under TBE and the keyword under
TBEKS. Then the data owner combines the ciphertexts and uploads them to
1 We choose the name TBEKS in order to separate it from TPEKS.
2 In a storage system, messages are actually files.
the server. To perform a search operation, at least t users generate their indi-
vidual trapdoors for the same target keyword W and upload the trapdoors to
the server via a secure communication channel. After that, the server searches
the whole database of ciphertexts with the given trapdoors and returns the re-
sult message indices back. Upon receiving the indices, the users retrieve the
corresponding ciphertexts and decrypt them with at least t users working to-
gether. Note that only the trapdoors are required to be transferred via a secure
communication channel.
Formally, we present the definition of Threshold Broadcast Encryption with
Keyword Search as follows.
Definition 2 (Threshold Broadcast Encryption with Keyword Search).
A threshold broadcast encryption with keyword search scheme, involving the data
users, the servers and the users Ui, consists of the following five possibly proba-
bilistic polynomial time algorithms:
– params← Setup(1k): The randomised system setup algorithm takes a secu-
rity parameter 1k, and outputs a set of parameters used in the system widely.
This algorithm can be run by anyone whereas all users are required to agree
on the same parameters.
– (PKi, SKi) ← KeyGen(params): The randomised user key generation al-
gorithm takes a system parameter params, and outputs a pair of secret key
SKi and public key PKi of a user Ui. This algorithm is run by the users
individually.
– C ← TBEKS({PK1, . . . , PKn}, t,W ): The randomised keyword encryption
algorithm takes a set of public keys {PK1, . . . , PKn} of n target users, a
threshold value t and a keyword W , and outputs a ciphertext C of the keyword
W . This algorithm is run by the data owner.
– T ← Trapdoor(SKi,W ): The possibly randomised trapdoor generation algo-
rithm takes the secret key SKi of a user Ui and a keyword W , and outputs
a user trapdoor T of the keyword W . This algorithm is run by the users
individually.
– 1/0 ← Test({T1, . . . , Tt}, C): The deterministic test algorithm takes t trap-
doors Ti ← Trapdoor(SKi,W ) and a keyword ciphertext C ← TBEKS({PK ′1,
. . . , PK ′n}, t′,W ′), and outputs{
1 if W = W ′ ∧ t ≥ t′ ∧ {PK1, . . . , PKn} ⊂ {PK ′1, . . . , PK ′n},
0 otherwise.
where (PKi, SKi)← KeyGen(params). This algorithm is run by the servers
and the results will be sent back to each user involved.
In addition, we require the scheme to be correct.
Definition 3 (Correctness). A threshold broadcast encryption with keyword
search scheme is correct if the following statement is always true:
∀params← Setup(1k), ∀(SK,PK)← KeyGen(params),
∀n, t ∈ Z+ ∧ t ≤ n, ∀W ∈ {0, 1}∗, ∀C ← TBEKS({PK1, . . . , PKn}, t,W ),
∀S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} ∧ t ≤ |S| ≤ n,
Test({T | T ← Trapdoor(SKi,W ) ∧ i ∈ S}, C) = 1.
3.2 Security Model
In Definition 2, we implicitly allow the server to combine the trapdoors for a
keyword freely without any interaction with related users. For instance, the data
owner creates C1 ← TBEKS({PK1, PK2}, 2,W ). To search for C1, the users
U1, U2 generate Ti ← Trapdoor(SKi,W ) for i = 1, 2. Later, the data owner
creates C2 ← TBEKS({PK2, PK3}, 2,W ) for the same keyword W . Similarly,
to search for C2, the users U2, U3 generate T
′
i ← Trapdoor(SKi,W ) for i = 2, 3.
If Trapdoor is a deterministic algorithm, the server can easily link T1, T2 and
T ′3 together that they are created for the same keyword since T2 = T
′
2. As a
result, if the data owner creates C3 ← TBEKS({PK1, PK2, PK3}, 3,W ), the
server can search C3 by Test({T1, T2, T ′3}, C3) = 1. However, the server gains
no information, especially the keyword encrypted in the trapdoors, other than
the test result. Instead, this provides a feature that the server can cache the
uploaded trapdoors from the users.
Because of this feature, we consider that the server is honest but curious.
Importantly, we do not allow the server to collude with any users. Otherwise,
the user U1 and the server can learn the keyword in the ciphertext. For example,
the server gets T1, T2 and T3 from the users to test C3. Then the server can use
T2 and T3 to test C2, and return the result to the user U1. Now, the user U1
knows the keyword of a ciphertext while U1 is not in the target user set.
We also do not consider the keyword guessing attack (KGA) [14], since the
server can always create a ciphertext C = TBEKS({PK}, 1,W ) for all the
keywords W with the user’s trapdoor T . Commonly, if the keyword space is
polynomial sized, the server can get the corresponding keyword W of C in poly-
nomial time. However, this kind of attack can be prevented by Xu et al.’s method
[14]. The BDOP scheme [4] also does not consider this attack.
In threshold broadcast encryption with keyword schemes, many users are in-
volved. We consider that all users are registered before creating the ciphertexts,
as the adversary may be able to register the private-public key pair of the tar-
get user. Now we define the indistinguishability in the threshold setting against
chosen keyword attack (IND-T-CKA) game Game 1 where an active adversary
A tries to distinguish two encryptions of keywords W0 and W1 with the security
parameter k:
1. The challenger runs the Setup(1k) algorithm to generate a set of system-wide
parameters and passes them to the adversary A.
GamekIND−T−CKA :
U , C,W ← ∅
params← Setup(1k)
(S, t,W0,W1)← AOKeyGen,OCorrupt,OTrapdoor (params)
b ∈R {0, 1}
C ← TBEKS({PKi}i∈S , t,Wb)
b′ ← AOKeyGen,OCorrupt,OTrapdoor (C)
OKeyGen :
(PKi, SKi)← KeyGen(params)
U ← U ∪ {Ui}
return PKi
OCorrupt :
C ← C ∪ {Ui} ⊂ U
return SKi
OTrapdoor :
T ← Trapdoor(SKi,W )
W ←W ∪ {W}
return T
AdvIND−T−CKAA =
∣∣∣∣Pr [b = b′ ∧ |S ∩ C| < t ∧W0,W1 /∈ W]− 12
∣∣∣∣
Game 1: IND-T-CKA
2. The adversary can adaptively ask the challenger to register a user and obtain
the public key of that user by querying the key generation oracle OKeyGen.
At the same time, the challenger records the requested user Ui in the user
list U .
3. The adversary can adaptively ask the challenger to obtain the secret key of
a registered user Ui ∈ U by querying the collusion oracle OCorrupt. At the
same time, the challenger records the requested user Ui in the collusion list
C.
4. The adversary can adaptively ask the challenger to obtain the user Ui’s trap-
door of a keyword W by querying the trapdoor generation oracle OTrapdoor.
At the same time, the challenger records the requested keyword W in the
keyword list W. For the corrupted users Ui ∈ C, the adversary can com-
pute the trapdoor by itself using the users Ui’s secret key SKi. Hence, the
keyword list W only contains the requested keywords of uncorrupted users.
5. At some point, the adversary A outputs a set S of users, a threshold value t
and two keywords W0 and W1 to be challenged. The adversary is restricted
that W0 and W1 are not in the list W as they are not queried to OTrapdoor.
The adversary is also restricted that it cannot corrupt t users or more in the
user set S.
6. The challenger randomly selects b to be 0 or 1, and gives a ciphertext C =
TBEKS({PKi}i∈S , t,Wb) to the adversary A.
7. The adversary can continue to query all three oracles OKeyGen, OCorrupt,
OTrapdoor with the same restrictions.
8. Eventually, the adversary A outputs a bit b′. If b = b′, the adversary wins
the game.
We define the advantage of winning Game 1 as
AdvIND−T−CKAA =
∣∣∣∣Pr [b = b′ ∧ |S ∩ C| < t ∧W0,W1 /∈ W]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Definition 4 (IND-T-CKA Security). A threshold broadcast encryption with
keyword search (TBEKS) scheme is indistinguishable in the threshold setting
against chosen keyword attack (IND-T-CKA) if AdvIND−T−CKAA is a negligible
function for all adversary A winning the Game 1 in polynomial time.
4 Construction
4.1 The Scheme
We build our TBEKS scheme based on Daza et al.’s TBE scheme [6] using the
idea similar to Boneh et al.’s PEKS scheme [4]. The main idea of the construction
is to use the secret keys of users as the shares of a shared secret in an (n, 2n− t)
threshold secret sharing scheme. The shared secret works as the secret key of a
dummy user in [4]. Since all computations are done with points on the elliptic
curve and due to the hardness of discrete logarithm problem (DLP), the secret
shares are computationally secure.
Our TBEKS scheme works as follows.
– params ← Setup(1k): Given a security parameter 1k, this algorithm gen-
erates a prime number of q bits and groups G1 and G2 of order q where
there is a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2. This algorithm also picks a ran-
dom generator P of G1. After that, the algorithm picks two hash functions
H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and H ′ : G1 → Zq. Note that the hash function H is
used to hash a keyword W into a point on the elliptic curve and the hash
function H ′ is used to hash the public key PKi of a user Ui to an domain
input ui = H
′(PKi) used in the threshold secret sharing scheme. Hence, it
is required H ′ to be a collision resistant hash function. Alternatively, instead
of using a hash function H ′, a user Ui can select its own unique ui and then
register along with its public key PKi to a certification authority. Thus each
user Ui has a unique public key PKi associated with a unique public value
ui. For the system simplicity, we use the hash function H
′.
G1 = 〈P 〉 , e : G1 ×G1 → G2, H : {0, 1}∗ → G1, H ′ : G1 → Zq.
return params = (q,G1,G2, P, e,H,H ′).
– (PKi, SKi)← KeyGen(params): With the system wide parameters param,
each user Ui randomly chooses a secret key SKi = xi ∈R Z+q . Then its public
key can be computed as PKi = xiP .
SKi = xi ∈ Z+q , PKi = xiP.
return (PKi, SKi).
– C ← TBEKS({PK1, . . . , PKn}, t,W ): To encrypt a keyword W , the data
owner first obtains all the public keys of the target users S = {U1, . . . , Un}.
Then the data owner obtains the associated input values U = {ui = H ′(PKi) |
Ui ∈ S}. Having n input values ui and PKi = xiP , we can recover/construct




ijPKi. To form an (n, 2n− t) threshold se-
cret sharing scheme, the data owner chooses n−t unique domain input values
D ← Zn−tq , where U ∩D = ∅, for n− t dummy users. Given the n− t dummy
users as a dummy user set D, the data owner can compute the public keys
of the dummy users by computing PKj = p(uj)P for all uj ∈ D. The detail
of this algorithm works as follows.
Q = p(0)P =
∑
Ui∈S
∆Si0PKi, s ∈R Z∗q , C1 = sP, C2 = e(H(W ), Q)s,
For each dummy user Uj ∈ D,
PKj = p(uj)P =
∑
Ui∈S
∆SijPKi, Kj = e(sH(W ), PKj).
return C = (S, t,D,C1, C2, {Kj}Uj∈D).
To improve computational efficiency, it is possible to reuse Q and PKj for
the same user set S and different keywords, since these two variables are
irrelevant to the keyword W and the randomness s. When calculating Kj ,
we can calculate sH(W ) before the loop so that all we need is a pairing
operation. For the ciphertext C, it is not necessary to include all the public
keys and the associated domain input values for both real users and dummy
users since we only need the domain input values later. For better efficiency,
this algorithm can return the ciphertext as C = (U , t,D, C1, C2, {Kj}Uj∈D).
As the values in D are not required to be chosen uniformly, the data owner
can choose a continuous interval that D = {r, r+ 1, r+ 2, . . . , r+ n− t− 1}
where r ∈R Zq. Thus D can be represented in two numbers in Zq. Hence, for
the best result, the ciphertext size is (n+ 3)Zq + (n− t+ 2)G1.
– T ← Trapdoor(SKi,W ): The user Ui generates the trapdoor T for the
keywordW simply using its secret key. Then the user Ui uploads the trapdoor
to the server via a secure communication channel.
T = xiH(W ).
return T .
– 1/0 ← Test({T1, . . . , Tt}, C): Upon receiving t trapdoors from the users
A = {U1, . . . , Ut} where |A ⊂ S| = t, the server can run the following
algorithm. If more than t target trapdoors are uploaded, the server only
picks the first t trapdoors.
For each user Ui ∈ A, Ki = e(Ti, C1),









Theorem 1. The proposed threshold broadcast encryption with keyword search
scheme is correct.
Proof. Correctness is verified as following. First, Ki can be calculated as
Ki = e(sH(W ), PKi) = e(sH(W ), xiP ) = e(xiH(W ), sP ) = e(Ti, C1).















Since the (n, 2n − t) threshold secret sharing scheme is constructed by n real
users S, distributing shares to n− t dummy users D, any n users in S ∪D can
recover the polynomial p used in the TBEKS algorithm. Having |D| = n − t
and S ∩ D = ∅ and |A ⊂ S| = t, we conclude that A ∩ D = ∅ and further
|B = (A∪D) ⊂ (S ∪D)| = n. Thus the algorithm can recover the polynomial p
with the users B. Then we have,∑
Ui∈B
∆Bi0PKi = p(0)P = Q.
Finally,
K = e(H(W ), Q)s = C2.
4.2 Security Proof
Theorem 2. The proposed threshold broadcast encryption with keyword search
scheme is IND-T-CKA secure. If an adversary A can win Game 1 with the
advantage ε, an algorithm S can be constructed to solve DBDH problem in poly-
nomial time with the advantage ε′ ≥ ε2e2(qC+1)(qT+1) , querying OCorrupt for at
most qC times and OTrapdoor for at most qT times.
Proof. Let δ = (P, aP, bP, cP, T ) be an instance of DBDH problem (recall def-
inition 1) that a simulator S is challenged to distinguish that δ ∈ DBDH or
δ ∈ Drand. From the DBDH instance D, the simulator S is also given two
groups G1 and G2 of the same order q, a generator P of G1 and a bilinear
map e : G1 × G1 → G2. The simulator S further chooses two hash functions
H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and H ′ : G1 → Zq. Then the simulator S packs those param-
eters as params = (q,G1,G2.P, e,H,H ′) and passes param to the adversary
A.
At the same time, the simulator S simulates the three oracles as follows.
– OH : The hash function H is viewed as a random oracle for the adversary
A simulated by the simulator S. Upon requesting the hash value of the
keyword Wi, the simulator S randomly tosses a coin ci ∈ {0, 1} such that
Pr[ci = 0] = α where α is determined later. The simulator S also chooses a




aiaP if ci = 0,
aiP if ci = 1.
The distribution of {hi} is indistinguishable with a random distribution of
G1. After that, the simulator S returns hi to the adversary A. In addition,
the simulator S maintains a hash list H = {Wi, ci, ai.hi}. If the requested
keyword W is on the list H, the simulator S returns hi directly.
– OKeyGen: To create a user Ui, the simulator S randomly tosses a coin di ∈
{0, 1} such that Pr[di = 0] = β where β is determined later. The simulator
also chooses a random value xi ∈ Z+q . Then the simulator S computes the
secret key SKi and the public key PKi as follows.
SKi =
{
unknown if di = 0,
xi if di = 1.
PKi =
{
xibP if di = 0,
xiP if di = 1.
In the case of di = 0, the secret key SKi = xib cannot be computed by and is
unknown to the simulator S since it is computational hard to compute b from
bP . The distribution of {PKi} is indistinguishable with a random distribu-
tion of G1. After that, the simulator S returns PKi to the adversary A. In
addition, the simulator S maintains a user key list K = {Ui, di, SKi, PKi}.
– OCorrupt: Upon requesting the secret key SKi of a created user Ui, the
simulator S searches the user key list K and checks the corresponding di
value. If di = 0, the simulator S aborts since the secret key SKi is unknown
to S. Otherwise, the simulator S returns SKi to the adversary A.
– OTrapdoor: To create a created user Ui’s trapdoor of a keyword Wj , the
simulator S first looks up the hash list H for Wj . If cj = 0, the simulator
S simply aborts. Otherwise, the simulator S computes the trapdoor T =
ajPKi and returns it to the adversary A. The correctness is verified as
follows.
T = ajPKi =
{
ajxibP = xibajP = xibhi = SKiH(Wj) if di = 0,
ajxiP = xiajP = xihi = SKiH(Wj) if di = 1.
Although the trapdoor is still able to be simulated in the case of cj = 1∧di =
0 as T = SKiH(Wj) = xihj = xiajaP , the simulator S still aborts for the
simplicity of this proof. In other words, the probability ε′ of solving the
DBDH problem is greater if the simulator S does not abort in the above
case but makes the proof harder. As long as ε′ is not negligible, it is still
acceptable.
At some point, the adversary A outputs a target user set S, a target threshold
value t and two target keyword W0 and W1. The simulator looks up the hash
list H for W0 and W1. If the keyword is not on the list H, the simulator asks
the OH oracle for its hash value and then the keyword is on the list. If the
corresponding values c0 and c1 of the keywords W0 and W1 is equals to 1, the
simulator S aborts. Otherwise, the simulator S randomly picks b ∈ {0, 1} such
that cb = 0. If there is only one c = 0, the simulator S has no choice and the
value b is fixed. Then we have H(Wb) = abaP . Due to the restrictions to the
adversary A, at least one user Uσ in S has not been corrupted. The simulator
S looks up the user key list K for that user. If the corresponding value dσ = 1,
the simulator S aborts. Otherwise, the simulator S divides the user set S into
two sets S0 = {Ui ∈ S | di = 0} and S1 = {Ui ∈ S | di = 1}. Intuitively, S0 6= ∅
because of the existence of Uσ. After that, the simulator S sets C1 = cP . Before
simulating C2, we first seek how the genuine ciphertext is computed:
C2 = e(H(W ), Q)























= e(P, P )abc·ab
∑
Ui∈S0













After that, the simulator S selects a set D of n− t dummy users with the same
restrictions in the normal construction (i.e. U ∩ D = ∅). Similar to C2, the









Finally, the simulator S packs the ciphertext C = (S, t,D,C1, C2, {Kj}Uj∈D)
and sends to the adversary A. Note that the resulted ciphertext C is consistent
only if T = e(P, P )abc.
Eventually, the adversary A outputs a guess b′. If b = b′, it means the cipher-
text is consistent and it is believed that T = e(P, P )abc. Hence, the simulator S
outputs δ ∈ DBDH . Otherwise, the simulator S outputs δ ∈ Drand.
Lemma 1. Let ρ be the probability of the simulator S not aborting. The advan-
tage ε′ of the simulator S solving the DBDH problem is at least ρε2 , assuming
the probability of δ ∈ DBDH is 12 and the adversary A wins Game 1 with the
advantage ε.
Proof. We prove this lemma by calculating the probability of the simulator S
succeeding. If δ ∈ Drand, the behaviour of the adversary A is unpredictable.
Thus, the simulator A succeeds at least better than a random guess with suc-
ceeding probability of 12 . Similarly, if the simulator S aborts, we just have a
random guess. Otherwise, we take the result of the adversary A with the correct
probability of 12 + ε. Let R be the event that the simulator S succeeds with a





Pr[S succeeds | δ ∈ DBDH ] +
1
2
Pr[S succeeds | δ ∈ Drand]
≥ 1
2
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2







































Lemma 2. The simulator S does not abort with the probability ρ at least
1
e2(qC + 1)(qT + 1)
,
querying OCorrupt for at most qC times and OTrapdoor for at most qT times.
Proof. There are 4 possible points that the simulator S may abort.
1. The simulator S aborts in answering OCorrupt queries if di = 0. The single
abort probability is β. The probability of not aborting for allOCorrupt queries
is Pr[E1] = (1− β)qC .
2. The simulator S aborts in answering OTrapdoor queries if ci = 0. The single
abort probability is α. The probability of not aborting for all OTrapdoor
queries is Pr[E2] = (1− α)qT .
3. The simulator S aborts in the challenge phase if c0 = c1 = 1. The probability
of not aborting for this event is Pr[E3] = 1 − (1 − α)2 = 2α − α2. Since
α ∈ [0, 1], we have
α ≤ 1 =⇒ α2 ≤ α =⇒ 0 ≤ α− α2 =⇒ α ≤ 2α− α2 = Pr[E3].
4. The simulator S aborts in the challenge phase if dδ = 1. The probability of
not aborting for this event is Pr[E4] = β.
Since all the events are independent, we have
ρ = Pr[E1] · Pr[E2] · Pr[E3] · Pr[E4] ≥ α(1− α)qT β(1− β)qC .


































e2(qC + 1)(qT + 1)
.
Note that the statement (1 − 1qT+1 )




true for any qT . Similar statement for qC also applies.
Combining AdvDBDHS ≥
ρε





ε′ = AdvDBDHS ≥
ε
2e2(qC + 1)(qT + 1)
.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we defined Threshold Broadcast Encryption with Keyword Search
(TBEKS) scheme and its IND-T-CKA security model. We proposed the first
TBEKS scheme and proved it is IND-T-CKA secure, assuming the hardness
of the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. In our TBEKS scheme, we
consider the server to be honest but curious and we do not allow the server to
collude with the users. It is an open problem to build a scheme that is secure
against a malicious server that may collude with other users.
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